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Nontechnical Summary
In 2005, an EU-wide emissions trading scheme covering major CO2 producing sites shall come into
power. The key objective of the trading scheme is to promote cost-efficiency of carbon reduction under
the EU burden sharing agreement that includes country-specific commitments for emission abatement.
Prior to enactment, each EU member state must develop a National Allocation Plan that defines the
overall cap on carbon emissions for installations included in the trading scheme and prescribes the
specific allocation rule of free allowances. Since there is no supranational law for strict harmonization,
major concerns persist that the implicit transfers to firms via individual National Allocation Plans could
lead to state aid and distort competition across energy-intensive firms that are covered by the trading
scheme.
In this paper, we identify policy-relevant tradeoffs between overall efficiency, compensation and
competitive neutrality which arise in the concrete implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme
through National Allocation Plans.
Using  a simple partial equilibrium framework, we show that - under the burden sharing agreement –
emission allocation factors to identical firms will generally differ across countries when EU member
states adopt the same rules for determining and distributing the emissions allocation budget. In order to
harmonize allocation factors and preserve competitive neutrality, country-specific adjustments of the
(initial) emissions allocation budgets for trading energy-intensive firms are necessary.
Based on numerical general equilibrium analysis for the EU, we substantiate the qualitative insights of the
stylized partial equilibrium assessment with policy-relevant quantitative information. In our simulations,
we find that the (output-based) allocation of free allowances to identical firms can vary by a factor of 5,
when Member States have determined emissions caps for the emissions trading sectors under overall
efficiency considerations in first place. Adjustments of the emissions caps to preserve uniform allocation
factors induces substantial welfare implications at the single country-level: Depending on the magnitude
and direction of the adjustment in emission allowances, a country may significantly lose or gain from
harmonization of the allocation factor.
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11.  Introduction
In May 2002, the European Union (EU) ratified the Kyoto Protocol under which the EU as a whole is
committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 8 % vis-à-vis 1990 emission levels during 2008-
2012 (UNFCCC 1997). The aggregate EU reduction requirement has been redistributed among individual
Member States according to an EU-internal burden sharing agreement (EU 1999).
Prior to the ratification, the European Commission launched a Directive for a pan-European carbon
trading system (EU 2001). The key objective of the Directive is to meet the EU reduction commitments
under the Kyoto Protocol more cost-effectively than by purely domestic action of individual Member
States. The Directive for an EU emissions trading scheme was approved by the European Parliament in
July 2003 and is scheduled to become legally binding by January 2005 (EU 2003). The envisaged trading
scheme consists of several temporal stages: a first phase from 2005 until 2007, a second one from 2008
until 2012, coinciding with the Kyoto commitment period, and subsequent five-year-periods covering
potential Post-Kyoto commitment periods. With respect to participation and coverage, the trading system
applies to energy-intensive (downstream) sectors that include all major CO2 producing sites such as
power, heat and steam generation, oil refineries, coke ovens in iron and steel production, mineral
industries (e.g. glass, cement) or pulp and paper plants.
According to Article 9 of the Directive, all individual Member States must develop a National Allocation
Plan (NAP) until March 2004 that (i) fixes an overall cap on carbon emissions for installations included in
the trading scheme, and (ii) prescribes the specific allocation rule of free allowances.1 Since there is no
supranational law for strict harmonization, major concerns persist that the implicit transfers to firms via
individual National Allocation Plans could lead to state aid and distort competition across firms that are
covered by the Directive.2
In this paper, we investigate potential tradeoffs between efficiency, compensation and discrimination (of
firms) that are at stake in implementing the EU Directive. Based on simulations with a large-scale
computable general equilibrium model for the EU (see Böhringer 2001 for a precursor model version), we
find that:
 EU emissions trading between energy-intensive industries can reduce total costs of meeting the Kyoto
target by roughly a third compared to purely domestic action. Yet, because of terms-of-trade effects,
emissions trading need not be beneficial for all EU Member States.
                                                          
1 Member States must allocate 95% of emission allowances for free until 2007 and can auction at most 10 percent of
the allowances in the period 2008-2012 (Article 10, EU 2003). Note that the implementation of the EU emissions
trading Directive is not conditioned on entering into force of the Kyoto Protocol (which – to date – still requires
ratification by Russia).
2 Prevention of competitive distortions is one of the “common criteria” listed in Annex 3 of the Directive for the
approval of a national allocation plan. The National Allocation Plans will be scrutinized by the Commission and can
be rejected, if common criteria are violated.
2 The potential efficiency gains from emissions trading will only materialize if allowances are allocated
in a non-distortionary (lump-sum) way to energy-intensive installations covered by the Directive. For
dynamic allocation rules where the assignment of emission allowances depends on endogenous
output decisions of firms, the implied distortions will nearly offset all efficiency gains. On the other
hand, such compensating transfers strongly attenuate the adverse production and employment impacts
of carbon emission constraints on politically influential energy-intensive industries.
 In the design of National Allocation Plans, the burden sharing agreement implies differences in
allocation schemes across countries. Whenever countries adopt the same rules for determining and
distributing the emissions budget to Directive sectors, the allocation factor of allowances to firms
with identical characteristics will differ across regions. In our quantitative simulations, the output-
based assignment of free allowances to identical firms can vary by a factor of 5, when Member States
have determined emission caps under overall efficiency considerations in first place.
 Harmonization of allocation factors requires country-specific adjustments in the partitioning of a
country’s Kyoto emissions budget between Directive sectors and Non-Directive sectors (away form
initial least-cost allocation). While these adjustments are negligible with respect to aggregate EU
economic impacts, the implications at the single country level can be substantial. Depending on the
magnitude and direction of the shift in emission rights between Directive and Non-Directive sectors,
a country may lose or gain from harmonization of the allocation factor.
The potential economic impacts of EU-type emissions trading schemes have been studied more recently
in several papers using stylized analytical approaches (see e.g. Böhringer and Lange 2003a) or large-scale
numerical models (see e.g. Capros and Mantzos 2000, Böhringer 2002, Böhringer and Lange 2003b). Key
findings such as the magnitude of efficiency gains from emissions trading and the potential distortions of
dynamic allocation rules coincide with some of our results. However, none of the previous studies, has
investigated the pending tradeoffs between efficiency, compensation and discrimination associated with
the concrete design of National Allocation Plans to implement the EU Directive in practice. To our
knowledge, the present analysis is the first that substantiates the controversial policy debate on the
obligatory development of National Allocation Plans with concrete quantitative insights.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we use a stylized partial equilibrium
analysis to illustrate the tradeoffs between efficiency, compensation and discrimination in the design of
National Allocation Plans. In section 3, we present a brief non-technical summary of the numerical
general equilibrium framework in use for the quantification of the potential economic impacts associated
with the implementation of the EU Directive. In section 4, we specify alternative policy scenarios and
interpret simulation results. In Section 5, we provide some final remarks.
32.  Stylized Partial Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we set up a simple partial model to capture central aspects of the design of National
Allocation Plans. We illustrate the economic implications of decision rules concerning (i) the partitioning
of a region’s overall emission budget between the emissions trading sector and the non-trading sector, and
(ii) the allocation of free allowances to the trading sector.
Each region r is represented by a two-sector economy, comprising the non-trading sector and the sector
captured by the trading scheme.3 A region r can partition its emissions budget 2
r
CO  under the burden
sharing agreement between the trading and the non-trading sector. Across all sectors and regions
emissions are limited by the total of 2
r
r
CO .
In each region r, the non-trading sector N is represented by an abatement cost function ( )Nr Nrc e
(differentiable, decreasing, convex). The representative firm in the trading sector T of region r is
described by the cost function ( , )Tr Tr Trc q e  (differentiable, increasing in q, decreasing in e, convex),
where Trq  denotes the output and Tre  the emissions level; the representative firm sells output at an
exogenously given price p. In the exposition below, qc and ec denote the partial derivatives of the cost
function with respect to q ( /c q  ) and e ( /c e  ).
2.1. Social Optimum
The optimal output and emissions levels within our stylized framework imply (i) equalization of marginal
abatement costs across sectors (as well as regions for the case of international emissions trading), and (ii)
equalization of marginal production costs and the output price. The optimal levels are given by:
( , )
( ) ( , )

  
Tr Tr Tr
q
Nr Nr Tr Tr Tr
e e
p c q e
c e c q e
(1)
Without international emissions trading, i.e. 2 
rNr Tre e CO , marginal abatement costs generally differ
across regions. Emissions trading provides efficiency gains through the equalization of marginal
abatement costs across regions. The uniform emissions price   is then endogenously determined by (1)
and the overall emissions constraint [ ] 2  
rNr Tr
r r
e e CO . In the following, we denote the
resulting optimal output and emissions levels by * * *( , , )Tr Tr Nr rq e e .
                                                          
3 Generalization to more than 2 sectors is straightforward but does not yield any additional insights.
42.2. Decentralization through National Allocation Plans
At the decentralized level of National Allocation Plan, each country has to specify the targeted emissions
2
Nr
CO in the non-trading sector and the allocation rule for the remaining emission allowances
( 2 2 2 
Tr r Nr
CO CO CO ) to installations in the trading sector. Reflecting overall efficiency objectives,
we assume that each country chooses its emissions in the non-trading sectors at the optimal level, i.e.
*2 
Nr NrCO e . The remaining emissions budget 2
Tr
CO  can then be allocated as emissions allowances to
the trading sector. For concreteness, we consider the policy-relevant allocation rule which assigns
allowances proportional to output, multiplied by an emissions-performance standard (benchmark)  :4
The firm in region r receives r Trq   allowances where r  denotes the region-specific allocation factor.5
The allocation rule provides implicit subsidies on output with firm’s decisions on output and emissions
levels based upon the following equilibrium conditions (the superscript “D” denotes the decentralized
case):
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Note that the allocation factor r  is endogenously determined to satisfy the region’s allocation constraint
2
Tr
CO .
Simple comparative-static analysis shows that the implicit output subsidy (or likewise an effective
increase in the output price) increases production and emission levels for any given positive emissions
price  .6 Keeping the allocation constraint *2 2
Tr r NrCO CO e   as of (1), the emissions price for the
Directive sector under (2) therefore will be higher than optimal whereas the specific emissions (i.e. the
emissions per unit of output) must be lower than optimal. Both effects lead to losses in aggregate
efficiency.
                                                          
4 Alternatively, allowances could be allocated based on emissions. For a generic comparison of emissions- and
output-based rules see Böhringer and Lange (2003b) who highlight the superiority of the output-based rule as a
compensating redistributive instrument.
5 Note that we investigate the allocation rule in a static setting where the assignment of allowances is proportional to
actual output levels. This can be interpreted as a condensed representation of a dynamic allocation scheme, where
the historical basis of allocation is continuously updated from period to period (e.g. as proposed by AGE 2003).
6 Differentiation of the equilibrium conditions lead to 0  
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5For each region r, the allocation factor r  is endogenously determined by ,2 
Tr r Tr DCO q  . Therefore,
the allocation rate per unit of output, r  , will generally differ across regions and, thus, violate
competitive neutrality of National Allocation Plans. In order to prevent competitive distortions, a
harmonization of allocation factors is required.
2.3. Harmonization of allocation factors
With respect to the harmonization of allocation factors (  r  ), we maintain the aggregate allocation of
emissions to the trading sector across all regions at the “optimal” level *2 2
Tr r Nr
r r
CO CO e   (see
(1)). This leads to the following equilibrium conditions (the superscript “H” denotes the harmonization
case):
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The impact of assignment factor harmonization on the output and emissions decisions and, therefore, on
welfare will vary across regions. Ceteris paribus, an increase of   leads to larger output distortions. This
implies a positive (negative) effect on welfare of regions which must decrease (increase) their specific
allocation factor r  under the harmonization.
The allowance allocation to trading sectors in region r under harmonization, ,Tr Hq , will generally
differ from the initial allocation ,2 
Tr r Tr DCO q  . In order to satisfy the burden sharing agreement, i.e.
the emissions endowment 2
r
CO , each region must adjust the abatement efforts in the non-trading sector
to satisfy: , ,2 
rNr H Tr He CO q . Compared to the social optimum (1) as well as the decentralized
case with non-uniform allocation factors (2), the adjustment of abatement burdens leads to higher or
lower abatement costs in the non-trading sector (depending on whether ,Nr He  is smaller or larger than
,*Nre ), hereby inducing efficiency losses. In our simple partial model, the total welfare effect of
harmonization for a country is only unambiguous (negative) if the region must increase its specific
allocation factor.
62.4. Illustration of the 2-country-case
We illustrate the effects of allocation rules for the case of two regions A and B that differ only with
respect to their emissions budget 2 2
A B
CO CO under some burden sharing agreement. Since the cost
functions for both countries are identical by assumption, optimal emission and output levels ( * *N Nre e ,
* *

T Tre e , and * *T Trq q ) must be identical.
In Figure 1, ( , )q e   denotes the solution to the equilibrium
condition ( ( , ), ) ( ( , ), ) T Tre qp c q e e c q e e   . For 0 , this renders the optimal output choice as a
function of the emissions level. Note that ( , )q e   is increasing in  . Therefore,
( , ) ( , ) ( ,0) A Bq e q e q e   if A B  .
Under the output-based rule, marginal (social) abatement costs are higher, resulting in an increased
emissions price D . Due to the different emission budgets ( 2 2
A B
CO CO ) we obtain A B   and, as
a consequence, a higher emissions and output level in region A than in B ( , ,TA D TB De e , , ,TA D TB Dq q ).
The output-based rule leads to efficiency losses which correspond to the shaded area.
Figure 1: Allocation schemes for countries differing only in their emissions
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7If the allocation factor is harmonized, emissions and output levels in the two regions would obviously be
identical again ( , ,TA H TB He e , , ,TA H TB Hq q ).7 Due to the implicit output subsidy, however, the output
level exceeds the optimal level *Tq . In order to satisfy the burden sharing agreement for a harmonized
allocation factor, the emissions in the non-trading sector must be adjusted. Since the emissions budget of
region A is larger, emissions in region A, ,NA He , would be greater than those in region B, ,NB He .
3.  Computable General Equilibrium Framework
The partial equilibrium analysis conveys important qualitative insights into the linkages between
efficiency, compensation and discrimination associated with the implementation of the EU Directive
through National Allocation Plans. However, for the sake of analytical tractability, it is highly stylized
and neglects potentially important general equilibrium effects. In contrast, a numerical approach
facilitates the analysis of complex nonlinear economic interactions and the impact assessment of
structural policy changes. In order to provide policy-relevant quantitative information, we make use of a
static 15-region, 9-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the EU economy calibrated to
empirical data. Due to the micro-consistent comprehensive representation of complex market interactions,
such CGE models have become the standard tool for economy-wide impact analysis of policy
interference on resource allocation (i.e. structural change) and the associated implications for incomes of
economic agents (see e.g. Conrad 2001).
At the sectoral level, our model incorporates sufficient details on differences in factor intensities, degrees
of factor substitutability and price elasticities of output demand in order to trace back the structural
change induced by environmental regulation. With respect to the analysis of carbon abatement policies,
the sectors in the model have been carefully selected to keep the most carbon-intensive sectors in the
available data as separate as possible. The energy goods identified in the model include primary carriers
(coal, natural gas, crude oil) and secondary energy carriers (refined oil products and electricity).
Furthermore, the model features three additional energy-intensive non-energy sectors (iron and steel;
paper, pulp and printing; non-ferrous metals) whose installations – in addition to the secondary energy
branches (refined oil products and electricity) – are subject to the EU emissions trading Directive. The
remaining manufacturers and services are aggregated to a composite industry that produces a non-energy-
intensive macro good. Table 1 summarizes the regions and sectors represented in the model.
The functional forms and key model assumptions are standard within the CGE approach to carbon
abatement policy analysis (see e.g. Rutherford and Paltsev 2002). A brief non-technical summary of the
generic model structure and its parameterization is provided below. A detailed algebraic exposition is
available from ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/nap.pdf.
                                                          
7 For reasons of transparency, we have not inserted this case explicitly in Figure 1.
8Table 1: Overview of model regions and sectors (commodities)
EU member countries Production sectors
AUT Austria Primary energy carriers
BEL Belgium COL Coal
DEU Germany CRU Crude oil
DNK Denmark GAS Natural gas
ESP Spain Energy-intensive sectors (EIS)
FIN Finland OIL Refined oil products
FRA France ELE Electricity
GBR United Kingdom ORE Iron and steel
GRC Greece PPP Paper, pulp, and printing
IRE Ireland NFM Non-ferrous metals
ITA Italy Remaining manufacturers and services
LUX Luxembourg ROI Rest of Industry
NLD Netherlands
PRT Portugal
SWE Sweden
3.1. Model Structure
Figure 2 provides a diagrammatic overview of the model structure. Primary factors of each EU region r
include labor rL , capital rK , and fossil-fuel resources ,ff rQ . Labor and capital are assumed to be mobile
across sectors within each region. In fossil fuel production, part of capital is treated as a sector-specific
resource, resulting in upward sloping supply schedules consistent with exogenous own-price elasticities
of supply. Factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive such that flexible prices of factors
ensure market clearance.8
Production Yir of commodities i in region r, other than primary fossil fuels, is captured by aggregate
production functions which characterize technology through substitution possibilities between various
inputs.
                                                          
8 Given persistent high unemployment rates in many EU countries, the assumption of competitive labor markets is
strong. However, the disputed causes for involuntary unemployment are country-specific and call for a sophisticated
treatment of institutional constraints at the single-country level which goes beyond the scope and focus of our
current analysis.
9Figure 2: Diagrammatic CGE model structure
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Nested, separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) cost functions with three levels are
employed to specify the substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital,
labor, energy and non-energy intermediate inputs, i.e. material.
At the top level, material inputs are employed in fixed proportions with an aggregate of
energy, capital and labor. At the second level, a CES function describes the substitution
possibilities between the energy aggregate and the aggregate of labor and capital. The value-
added composite is a CES function of labor and capital. The energy aggregate is produced
with a CES function of a non-electric energy composite and electricity. The non-electric
energy composite is then a CES function of coal, crude oil, refined oil, and natural gas. In the
production of fossil fuels, all inputs, except for the sector-specific fossil fuel resource, are
aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. At the top level, this aggregate trades off
with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant elasticity of substitution. The latter is
calibrated in consistency with exogenous price elasticities of fossil fuel supply.
Final consumption demand Cr in each region is determined by a representative agent RAr,
who maximizes consumption subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment. Aggregate
consumption of the representative agent is given as a CES composite which combines
composite energy consumption with a non-energy consumption bundle. Substitution patterns
within the non-energy consumption bundle are reflected via Cobb-Douglas functions. The
energy aggregate in final demand consists of the various energy goods trading off at a
constant elasticity of substitution. Government demand within each region is fixed at
exogenous real levels. Public goods and services are produced with a CES aggregation of
commodity inputs. The expenditure for public good provision is handled through the budget
constraint of the representative agent.
Trade between regions is specified using the Armington approach to product heterogeneity,
so domestic and foreign goods of the same variety are distinguished by origin. The
Armington composite Air for a traded good is a CES function of an imported composite Mir
and domestic production for that sector. The import composite is then a CES function of an
EU import composite and imports from the rest of the world (ROW). The EU import
composite of a specific EU region in turn is a CES function of production from all other EU
countries. EU countries are assumed to be price-takers with respect to world market prices,
i.e. ROW import-supply functions and ROW export-demand functions are perfectly elastic.
There is an imposed balance of payment constraint to ensure trade balance between the EU
and ROW through a flexible exchange rate. That is, the value of imports from the ROW to
the EU must equal the value of exports from the EU to the ROW after accounting for the
benchmark trade deficit or surplus of EU regions.
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3.2. Data and Calibration
The effects of policy changes are measured with respect to a reference situation – labeled as
Business-as-Usual (BaU). In comparative-static analysis, the reference situation is captured
by economic transactions in a particular benchmark year (1997 in our case). As is customary
in applied general equilibrium analysis, benchmark quantities and prices – together with
exogenous elasticities (see Table A.6 in the download) – determine the parameters of
functional forms. For this model calibration, we employ the GTAP-5E database (McDougall
et al. 1999) which provides most recent consistent accounts of regional production and
consumption, bilateral trade and energy flows for up to 66 countries and 23 commodities.
4.  Policy Scenarios and Quantitative Results
Table 2 provides a summary of historic and projected CO2 emissions together with the
respective percentage emission reduction requirements. The columns “CO2 emissions - 1990”
and “Reduction requirements (in %) - 1990”) report absolute CO2 emissions and the
percentage reduction commitments across EU Member States under the burden sharing
agreement with respect to the Kyoto benchmark year 1990
Table 2: CO2 emissions and CO2 reduction requirements (EiE 1999)
CO2 emissions
(in mill. tons)
Reduction requirements
(in %)
1990 2010 1990 2010
AUT Austria 55.0 54.8 13.0 12.7
BEL Belgium 104.8 124.0 7.5 21.8
DEU Germany 951.6 827.5 21.0 9.2
DNK Denmark 52.7 54.9 21.0 24.2
ESP Spain 201.9 274.1 -15.0 15.3
FIN Finland 51.3 73.6 0.0 30.3
FRA France 352.4 389.7 0.0 9.6
GBR United Kingdom 566.9 572.3 12.5 13.3
GRC Greece 70.9 109.4 -25.0 19.0
IRE Ireland 30.1 42.8 -13.0 20.5
ITA Italy 388.0 429.9 6.5 15.6
LUX Luxembourg 10.6 8.9 28.0 14.2
NLD Netherlands 153.0 205.6 6.0 30.0
PRT Portugal 39.1 66.5 -27.0 25.3
SWE Sweden 50.5 64.0 -4.0 17.9
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Since the commitments do not apply prior to the Kyoto budget period 2008-2012, the
effective cutback requirements will depend on the future evolution of emissions under
Business-as-Usual. The column labeled “CO2 emissions – 2010” reports official EU
projections of baseline emissions for the central year 2010 of the Kyoto budget period (EiE
1999). Accounting for the cross-country differences in projected carbon emissions, the targets
with respect to 1990 translate into quite different effective targets with respect to 2010
(column “CO2 emissions - 2010”): Spain, for example, receives carbon emission rights under
the burden sharing agreement that are 15 % higher than its 1990 emissions, but – as of 2010 –
it must cut back emissions by roughly 15 % vis-à-vis its projected baseline. Contrary,
Germany faces a reduction commitment of 21 % from 1990 levels but this boils down to an
effective reduction requirement of 9.2 % since German baseline emissions are projected to
fall considerably below 1990 emission levels (mostly due to “wallfall-profits” from
reunification) .
In our policy simulations, we abstain from a forward calibration of the European economy to
projected 2010 statistics. The reasons for this are the uncertainties and potentially large
inconsistencies associated with projections which are based on partial analytical studies.9
Instead, we use the projected effective percentage reduction requirements for EU member
countries under the Kyoto Protocol and impose these emission constraints on our EU
benchmark data for 1997 which is based on empirical observations.
4.1. Scenarios
We consider four scenarios that cover key dimensions of the policy debate on the
implementation of the EU emissions trading Directive. The first scenario captures the
extreme point of purely domestic action:
 Scenario NoTRADE reflects a situation in which all EU Member States meet their burden
sharing commitments through domestic action only. The domestic governments set
emission taxes sufficiently high to comply with the national reduction targets.10 Carbon
tax revenues accrue lump-sum to the representative agent. The NoTRADE simulation
delivers a reference point for the magnitude and distribution of efficiency gains that
emerge from cross-country emissions trading within the EU.
The next two scenarios address the implementation of the EU Directive through National
Allocation Plans which requires the concrete specification of two fundamental design rules.
                                                          
9 See Böhringer et al. (2000) for the problems involved in baseline calibration of CGE models to
exogenous bottom-up projections.
10 Likewise, the government could auction emission permits within domestic borders, aligning the total
amount of auctioned permits with its emission budget.
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First, the total number of tradable allowances for energy-intensive sectors (installations)
subject to the Directive must be determined. Second, the rule of how allowances get allocated
to these sectors must be chosen. Regarding the choice of the emission cap, we adopt the
principle of cost-effectiveness as put forward by Article 1 of the Directive (EU 2003). The
cost-effective partitioning of a country’s emission budget between Directive sectors and Non-
Directive sectors (including the household sector) is based on full “where-flexibility” of
emission abatement within the EU leading to equalized marginal abatement costs across all
EU carbon sources. The emission limit that applies to the Non-Directive sectors then equals
the aggregate emissions of these branches under full “where-flexibility”; the emission cap for
the Directive sectors is the remaining residual of the country-specific emissions budget.11
Regarding the allocation rule for emission allowances to Directive sectors, we distinguish
between auctioning, where energy-intensive sectors must buy emission rights at the level of
their actual emissions, and grandfathering, where emission allowances are shared out in
proportion to sectoral output level times some historical emission intensity (AGE 2003):
 Scenario AUCTION reflects National Allocation Plans where allowance allocation to
Directive sectors is based on auctioning. Revenues from auctioning accrue lump-sum to
the representative agent.
 Scenario OUTPUT reflects National Allocation Plans where emission allowances are
allocated to Directive sectors proportional to output times some historical emission
intensity (in our case: 1997 emission intensities).
As discussed in Section 2, uniform combination of the least-cost approach and free allocation
under the EU burden sharing agreement implies that installations (sectors) with identical
characteristics will typically face different allocation factors across Member States. Our final
scenario OUTPUT* warrants competitive neutrality by harmonizing the allocation factor:
 Scenario OUTPUT* employs an output-based allocation rule with a uniform allocation
factor which is derived under scenario OUTPUT if one replaces the burden sharing
constraints for each EU member state by the aggregate EU emission commitment under
the Kyoto Protocol. In order to comply with the country-specific EU burden sharing
agreement, we must endogenously adjust the least-cost partitioning between Directive
sectors and Non-Directive sectors.
                                                          
11 The least-cost approach could be implemented with a hybrid tax-and-permit system. Domestic
governments would have to set taxes for the Non-Directive sectors sufficiently high to meet their
respective emission limits whereas the Directive sectors would be involved in EU-wide emissions
trading subject to the respective emission caps.
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Table 3 summarizes the main features of our four policy scenarios.
Table 3: Overview of  key scenarios
Scenario Regulation Scheme
Directive sectors Non-Directive Sectors
International
Emissions
Trading
NoTRADE Carbon tax Carbon tax No
AUCTION Permit trade (auctioned) Carbon tax Yes
OUTPUT
Permit trade (output-based
allocation with endogenous non-
uniform allocation factors)
Carbon tax Yes
OUTPUT*
Permit trade (output-based
allocation with exogenous
uniform allocation factor)
Carbon tax Yes
4.2. Results
Table 4 summarizes the impacts on consumption, production and employment at the
aggregate EU level (measured as percentage changes from BaU values).12
Table 4: Aggregate EU impacts (in % change from BaU)
NoTRADE AUCTION OUTPUT OUTPUT*
Consumption
-0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12
Output
Total -0.23 -0.17 -0.25 -0.26
Directive sectors -4.33 -3.36 -1.40 -1.20
Non-Directive sectors -0.23 -0.16 -0.25 -0.26
Employment
Directive sectors -1.96 -1.90  0.96  0.94
Non-Directive sectors  0.08  0.08 -0.04 -0.04
Flexibility to abate emissions within the EU where it is least costly provides substantial
efficiency gains: Compared to purely domestic action under NoTRADE, aggregate EU
compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol are more than 30 % lower under AUCTION.
However, the potential cost savings are eaten up when emission allowances are not auctioned
but freely allocated to Directive sectors proportional to output. Here, the implied output
                                                          
12 Note that we only account for the gross economic impacts of carbon emission constraints without
accounting for potential environmental benefits.
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subsidies create efficiency losses that outweigh the efficiency gains from equalized marginal
abatement costs across Directive sectors (scenarios: OUTPUT, OUTPUT*). At the same time,
the subsidies preserve production and employment in Directive sectors. The decline in
energy-intensive production under OUTPUT and OUTPUT* amounts only to a fraction of the
value under AUCTION.
The subsidy-induced price distortions may even increase employment in energy-intensive
sectors above BaU levels due to factor substitution effects. While such compensation to
influential energy-intensive industries may be comprehensible under specific political
economy considerations (see e.g. Stavins 1998), it clearly does not only work at the expense
of overall efficiency but is also detrimental for the performance of Non-Directive sectors.
Table 5 provides details on cross-country differences in allocation factors r  for scenario
OUTPUT. The endogenous factors range from 0.17 (NLD - Netherlands) up to 0.83 (DEU -
Germany) meaning that an identical installation in Germany receives five times the emission
allowance per unit of output than in the Netherlands. Obviously, the wide range in allocation
factors which emerges from our simulations justifies serious policy concerns on the
competitive neutrality of the EU Directive implementation.
Table 5: Allocation factors and emission allocation to Directive sectors
AUT BEL DEU DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRL ITA LUX NLD PRT SWE
Specific allocation factors r  (scenario: OUTPUT)
0.71 0.38 0.83 0.71 0.68 0.53 0.78 0.79 0.68 0.66 0.71 0.53 0.17 0.41 0.24
Uniform allocation factor *  (scenario: OUTPUT*)
0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
“Efficient” emission allocation to Directive sectors in % of overall emission budget (scenario: OUTPUT)
25 11 40 41 26 36 13 31 34 33 27 7 5 16 5
Adjusted emission allocation to Directive sectors in % of overall emission budget (scenario: OUTPUT*)
26 23 33 43 27 52 12 28 37 37 28 11 28 30 16
Key: AUT- Austria, BEL - Belgium, DEU - Germany, DNK- Denmark, ESP - Spain, FIN - Finland, FRA - France, GBR -
United Kingdom, GRC - Greece, IRE - Ireland, ITA - Italy, LUX - Luxembourg, NLD - Netherlands, PRT - Portugal ,
SWE – Sweden.
Harmonization towards a uniform allocation factor *  through shifts in the partitioning of
country-specific Kyoto emission budgets, induce rather small changes in aggregate EU
economic indicators (see column “OUTPUT*” in Table 4), but – as laid out below – the
implications at the single-country level can be substantial.
How can we derive a meaningful uniform allocation factor * ? In principle, one could
impose any factor that Member States might agree upon (e.g. a weighted average of the
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endogenous factors r  listed in Table 5) and, subsequently, adjust the partitioning of the
emission budget between the Directive and Non-Directive sectors to comply with the burden
sharing agreement. Yet, we are not aware of any concrete allocation factor that is put forward
in the policy debate. Thus, we perform an endogenous calculation of the uniform allocation
factor where we preserve the least-cost partitioning of emissions between the Directive and
the Non-Directive sectors at the aggregate EU level while imposing only an EU-wide
emission cap for Directive sectors. We then impose the resulting allocation factor (central
case value: 0.72) exogenously and adjust the country-specific partitioning of emissions
between Directive and Non-Directive sectors to comply with the burden sharing agreement
(scenario: OUTPUT*).
Whenever the uniform allocation factor *  is above a country’s r , it must shift further
emission rights from the Non-Directive sectors to the Directive sectors and vice versa. Table
5 reports the partitioning of a country’s emissions budget between Directive and Non-
Directive sectors for scenarios OUTPUT (least-cost partitioning with non-uniform allocation
factors) and OUTPUT* (adjustments under allocation factor harmonization).
Table 6 reports the impacts on real consumption for individual Member States. The first
insight is that individual Member States are not necessarily better off from emissions trading
(comparison between NoTRADE and AUCTION). The reason for this are changes in the terms
of trade which can enforce or weaken a country’s unambiguous cost savings on the emissions
market through permit trade.13 Adverse terms-of-trade effects more than offset the direct
efficiency gains from emissions trading for the countries Austria, Greece, and Italy. Most EU
countries, however, are distinctly better off under auctioned permit trade across energy-
intensive industries compared to purely domestic action.
Revenue-rebating to energy-intensive sectors through output-based allocation of emission
allowances induces a decline in real consumption for any single EU Member State as
compared to an auctioned permit system. Due to the production subsidies under OUTPUT,
the output level of EU energy-intensive production is higher than in the efficient AUCTION
solution, while the overall emission rate must be smaller than in the efficient case to meet the
given EU-wide emission cap.
Application of a uniform allocation factor for identical firms across different regions requires
adjustment of the emission cap assignments between industries covered by the Directive and
the remaining segments of the economy.
                                                          
13 See Böhringer and Rutherford (2002) for a detailed discussion and decomposition of terms-of-trade
effects.
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Table 6: Consumption changes by member state (in % change from BaU)
NoTRADE AUCTION OUTPUT OUTPUT*
AUT Austria -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09
BEL Belgium -0.26 -0.21 -0.32 -0.38
DEU Germany -0.02 0.03 0.01  0.03
DNK Denmark -0.13 -0.06 -0.14 -0.13
ESP Spain -0.48 -0.33 -0.57 -0.64
FIN Finland -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
FRA France -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11
GBR United Kingdom -0.17 -0.17 -0.26 -0.26
GRC Greece -0.09 -0.10 -0.16 -0.17
IRE Ireland -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12
ITA Italy -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.17
LUX Luxembourg -0.86 -0.55 -0.65 -0.76
NLD Netherlands -0.41 -0.32 -0.39 -0.42
PRT Portugal -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11
SWE Sweden -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 -0.19
EU Europe-15 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12
As illustrated by our stylized partial equilibrium analysis of Section 2, the aggregate direct
efficiency effect may be ambiguous. While the shift away from the initial least-cost emission
partitioning causes additional efficiency losses, a decreased allocation of (free) emission
allowances to Directive sectors of a Member State reduces the associated output distortions.
Only when the harmonization of the allocation factor leads to an increased allocation of (free)
emissions, the direct efficiency implications are unambiguously negative. The basic partial
equilibrium reasoning holds also for our general equilibrium analysis in most cases: All
regions that must substantially upgrade their emission allowance to Directive sectors face
non-negligible additional consumption losses via-à-vis the OUTPUT scenario.14
Table 7 reports the marginal abatement costs across the key policy scenarios that might differ
between the Directive sectors and the Non-Directive segments of the economy. Under
NoTRADE the marginal abatement costs are equivalent to the domestic carbon tax, which EU
Member States must levy to achieve their exogenous emissions reduction targets. A key
determinant for the magnitude of marginal abatement costs is the effective cutback
                                                          
14 If the upgrading is not sufficiently pronounced, additional indirect general equilibrium effects (such
as changes in the terms of trade) may override the partial equilibrium result as is the case for Spain and
Denmark.
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requirement. Ceteris paribus, the more a country has to reduce emissions, the more costly it is
at the margin to substitute away from carbon in production and consumption. The substantial
marginal abatement costs for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, and Portugal reflect
large reduction requirements vis-à-vis countries such as Germany or France that have low
marginal costs along with low abatement targets. However, there are other important
determinants of marginal abatement costs, such as initial BaU energy prices or differences in
the carbon intensities of sectors that explain why a country (e.g. Austria) may need higher
carbon taxes than another one (e.g. United Kingdom) although its percentage reduction target
is smaller. Likewise the level of marginal abatement costs is only a crude indicator for the
magnitude of inframarginal adjustment costs to emission constraints as several potentially
important general equilibrium effects are not accounted for (terms-of-trade effects, tax
interaction effects, etc.).
Table 7: Marginal abatement costs in €2002 per ton of CO2
NoTRADE AUCTION OUTPUT OUTPUT*
Directive
Sectors
Non-
Directive
Sectors
Directive
Sectors
Non-
Directive
Sectors
AUT 31 23 40 24 39 27
BEL 57 23 40 23 39 95
DEU 12 23 40 24 39 0
DNK 13 23 40 23 39 40
FIN 65 23 40 23 39 175
FRA 24 23 40 23 39 20
GBR 22 23 40 23 39 13
GRC 22 23 40 24 39 38
IRE 32 23 40 25 39 46
ITA 28 23 40 24 39 27
LUX 31 23 40 23 39 43
NET 78 23 40 23 39 143
PRT 61 23 40 24 39 114
SWE 25 23 40 24 39 32
Key: AUT- Austria, BEL - Belgium, DEU - Germany, DNK- Denmark, ESP - Spain, FIN - Finland, FRA - France, GBR -
United Kingdom, GRC - Greece, IRE - Ireland, ITA - Italy, LUX - Luxembourg, NLD - Netherlands, PRT - Portugal ,
SWE – Sweden.
An efficient implementation of the EU Directive, that combines least-cost partitioning of the
Kyoto budget with an auctioned permit system for energy-intensive industries, implies a
tradable permit price of 23 €2002 per ton of CO2. When revenues are rebated to Directive
sectors via output-based allocation, the marginal abatement costs for the Directive sectors and
19
the Non-Directive sectors fall apart. Due to the output subsidies, emission reduction efforts in
the Directive sectors are shifted towards more costly emission rate reductions and away from
less costly output reduction. This is reflected in substantially higher marginal abatement costs
for energy-intensive industries in Europe (40 €2002 per ton of CO2 for OUTPUT and 39 €2002
per ton of CO2 for OUTPUT* respectively). Regarding the Non-Directive sectors, there are
only slight deviations under scenario OUTPUT from the uniform marginal abatement costs
under AUCTION (due to general equilibrium spillovers). Under scenario OUTPUT*,
however, there are drastic changes whose magnitude and direction mirror the adjustments of
emission allocations as reported in Table 5. For countries, where the harmonization of the
allocation factor leads to an increased allocation of emissions to Non-Directive sectors
(Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), the marginal abatement costs fall below the
OUTPUT reference price of 23 €2002 per ton of CO2; the opposite applies to countries with
decreased allocation of emissions to Non-Directive sectors. The associated shifts range from
zero marginal abatement costs in the case of Germany (i.e. the Non-Directive sectors receives
an emission budget which is in excess of its equilibrium emission) to more than 175 €2002 per
ton of CO2 for Non-Directive sectors in Finland.
In our core simulations, we have not incorporated the possibility of project-based emissions
trading with non EU countries via joint implementation (JI) or the clean development
mechanism (CDM) (as foreseen under the Kyoto Protocol and – in principle – being
considered within the EU emissions trading Directive). Second, the possibility of purchasing
“hot air” from Russia (in case of Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol) is not considered.
Third, the forthcoming EU accession of Eastern European countries and their integration into
the provisions of the EU emissions trading Directive has been omitted. All three subjects -
JI/CDM, trade in hot air, and EU Eastern Enlargement increase the low-cost potential for
emission abatement within the EU. Sensitivity analysis shows that – while the volume and
price of extra-EU supply in emission rights alter the concrete numbers of the core simulation
– all of our qualitative results remain robust.
5.  Conclusions
In 2005, an EU-wide emissions trading scheme among energy-intensive installations is
scheduled to start. Prior to enactment, each EU member state must develop a National
Allocation Plan that defines the quantity of allowances it intends to allocate and the specific
rules for the allocation of emission allowances to energy-intensive installations.
Starting from an efficient aggregate emissions cap for the energy-intensive sectors which
participate in emissions trading under the EU Directive, we studied the impacts of output-
based allocation schemes. Under the burden sharing agreement, allocation factors will
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generally differ across countries such that concerns on competitive distortions might be
justified. In order to harmonize allocation factors and preserve competitive neutrality, an
adjustment of the emissions caps for Directive (trading) sectors and Non-Directive (non-
trading) sectors abatement policies in non-trading sectors is necessary, which can have
substantial efficiency effects at the single-country level..
Using a CGE model to quantify the effects, our analysis provides policy-relevant information
into the potential tradeoffs between efficiency, compensation, and competitive neutrality
associated with the implementation of an EU emissions trading system. It will be interesting
to see how policy is going to address these tradeoffs in the near future.
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IWe provide an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for our comparative-static
model designed to investigate the economic implications of alternative policies to implement
carbon emission constraints. For the generic model the following assumptions apply:
 Nested separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions characterize the use
of inputs in production. All production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. Goods are
produced with capital, labor, energy and material (KLEM).
 A representative agent (RA) in each region is endowed with three primary factors: natural
resources (used for fossil fuel production), labor and capital. The RA maximizes utility
from consumption of a CES composite subject to a budget constraint with fixed
investment demand (i.e. fixed demand for the savings good). The aggregate consumption
bundle combines demands for fossil fuels, electricity and non-energy commodities. Total
income of the RA consists of factor income and taxes (including revenues from carbon
taxes or auctioned carbon permits).
 Supplies of labor, capital and fossil-fuel resources are exogenous. Labor and capital are
mobile within domestic borders but cannot move between regions; natural resources are
sector specific.
 All goods are differentiated by region of origin. Constant elasticity of transformation
functions (CET) characterize the differentiation of production between production for the
domestic markets and the export markets. Regarding imports, nested CES functions
characterize the choice between imported and domestic varieties of the same good
(Armington).
 Goods from regions which are not explicitly represented (rest of the world - ROW) are
differentiated, and a set of horizontal export demand and import supply functions
determine the trade between ROW and the regions whose production and consumption
patterns are described in detail. In other words, the representation of ROW is reduced to
import and export flows with the explicit regions of the model where the latter are
assumed to be price-takers with respect to ROW import and export prices.
The model is formulated as a system of nonlinear inequalities. These inequalities correspond
to two classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit and market clearance. The fundamental
unknowns of the system are two vectors: activity levels and prices. In equilibrium, each of
these variables is linked to one inequality condition: an activity level to a zero-profit
condition and a commodity (factor) price to a market-clearance condition.
In the algebraic exposition below, the notation zir  is used to denote the (zero-)profit
function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned to the associated production
activity. Differentiating the profit function with respect to input and output prices provides
compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotellings’s lemma), which appear
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subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We use i (aliased with j) as an index for
commodities (sectors) and r (aliased with s) as an index for regions. The label EG represents
the set of energy goods and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil fuels. Tables A.1 - A.6
explain the notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic exposition.
Figures A.1 - A.5 provide a graphical exposition of the production and final consumption
structure.
Zero Profit Conditions
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where irY  ( i ff ) is the associated activity variable.
2. Production of fossil fuels:
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where irY ( i ff ) is the associated activity variable.
3. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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 where irE  is the associated activity variable.
4. Armington aggregate:
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where irA  is the associated activity variable.
5. Aggregate imports across import regions:
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where irM  is the associated activity variable.
6. Household consumption aggregate:
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where rC  is the associated activity variable.
7. Household energy aggregate:
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where CrE  is the associated activity variable.
8. Investment:
0I I AIir irrr
i
 =  -  pp  
where rI  is the associated activity variable.
Market Clearance Conditions
9. Labor:
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where rw  is the associated price variable.
10. Capital:
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where r  is the associated price variable.
11. Natural resources:
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where irq  is the associated price variable.
12. Output for internal markets:
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where irp  is the associated price variable.
13. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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where Eirp  is the associated price variable.
14. Import aggregate:
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where Mirp  is the associated price variable.
15. Armington aggregate:
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where Airp  is the associated price variable.
16. Investment aggregate:
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where Irp  is the associated price variable.
17. Household consumption:
2 2C CO I r rrr r rr jr r rjrr r
j FF
p  =   +   + q Q p CO p I BC w vL K

  
where Crp  is the associated price variable.
18. Aggregate household energy consumption:
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where ECrp  is the associated price variable.
19. Carbon emissions:
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where 2COrp  is the associated price variable.
20. Balance of payments:
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where Wp  is the associated price variable.
Table A.1: Sets
i Sectors and goods
j Aliased with i
r Regions
s Aliased with r
EG All energy goods: Coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: Coal, crude oil and gas
LQ Liquid fuels: Crude oil and gas
Table A.2: Activity variables
irY Production in sector i and region r
irE Aggregate energy input in sector i and region r
irM Aggregate imports of good i and region r
irA Armington aggregate of good i in region r
rC Aggregate household consumption in region r
CrE Aggregate household energy consumption in region r
rI Aggregate investment in region r
VI
Table A.3: Price variables
pir Output price of good i produced in region r for domestic market
Wp Real exchange rate with the rest of the world (ROW)
pEir Price of aggregate energy in sector i and region r
pMir Import price aggregate for good i imported to region r
A
irp Price of Armington good i in region r
pCr Price of aggregate household consumption in region r
pECr Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region r
I
rp Price of aggregate investment good in region r
rw Wage rate in region r
rv Price of capital services in region r
irq Rent to natural resources in region r (i  FF)
2CO
rp Shadow price of CO2 unit in region r
Table A.4: Cost shares
XROW
ir
Share of ROW exports in sector i and region r
jir Share of intermediate good j in sector i and region r (iFF)
KLE
ir
Share of KLE aggregate in sector i and region r (iFF)
E
ir
Share of energy in the KLE aggregate of sector i and region r (iFF)
T
ir
Share of labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and region r (iFF)
Q
ir
Share of natural resources in sector i of region r (iFF)
FF
Tir
Share of good i (T=i) or labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and
region r (iFF)

COA
ir Share of coal in fossil fuel demand by sector i in region r (iFF)

ELE
ir
Share of electricity in energy demand by sector i in region r
jir Share of liquid fossil fuel j in energy demand by sector i in region r
(iFF, jLQ)

M
isr
Share of imports of good i from region s to region r
MROW
ir Share of ROW imports of good i in region r

A
ir
Share of domestic variety in Armington good i of region r
VII

E
Cr
Share of fossil fuel composite in aggregate household consumption in
region r
I
ir
Share of good i in investment composite in region r
ir Share of non-energy good i in non-energy household consumption
demand in region r

E
iCr
Share of fossil fuel i in household energy consumption in region r
Table A.5: Endowments and emissions coefficients
Lr Aggregate labor endowment for region r
rK Aggregate capital endowment for region r
irQ Endowment of natural resource i for region r (iFF)
Br Balance of payment deficit or surplus in region r (note: 0
r
rB )
2CO r Endowment of carbon emission rights in region r
2CO
ia Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i (iFF)
Table A.6: Elasticities
 Transformation between production for the domestic market
and production for the export
2
KLE
Substitution between energy and value-added in production
(except fossil fuels)
0.8
iQ, Substitution between natural resources and other inputs in
fossil fuel production calibrated consistently to exogenous
supply elasticities FF .
COA=0.5
CRU=1.0
GAS =1.0
ELE
Substitution between electricity and the fossil fuel aggregate in
production
0.3
COA
Substitution between coal and the liquid fossil fuel composite
in production
0.5
A
Substitution between the import aggregate and the domestic
input
4
M
Substitution between imports from different regions 8
EC
Substitution between the fossil fuel composite and the non-
fossil fuel consumption aggregate in household consumption
0.8
CFF ,
Substitution between fossil fuels in household fossil energy
consumption
0.3
VIII
Figure A.1: Nesting in non-fossil fuel production
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Figure A.2: Nesting in fossil fuel production
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Figure A.3: Nesting in household consumption
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Figure A.4: Nesting in Armington production
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Figure A.5: Nesting in import aggregate
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Implementation of Emission Abatement Scenarios
We can distinguish our policy scenarios on the implementation of the EU emissions trading
Directive along two key dimensions: (i) whether emissions can be traded internationally, and
(ii) whether emission allowances are allocated for free to specific sectors (according to an
output-based rule). In order to distinguish scenario-specific carbon prices by sector, we must
explicitly account for carbon demands within the zero-profit conditions characterizing the
sector-specific energy aggregate and the household energy aggregate (instead of the
Armington aggregate). Carbon demands by segment z (i for production sector or C  for the
household sector) then read as:
2 22 ( )
E
ir
ir ir CO CO
j ff jr j jr
 CO  = E  
 p a p

 
 
  and 2 22 ( )
C
r
Cr Cr CO CO
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For the NoTRADE scenario, where domestic governments must set emission taxes
sufficiently high to comply with the national reduction targets 2rCO , the market clearance
condition determining the carbon price (carbon tax) can be written as:
2 2r zr
z
CO  CO .
XIn the remaining scenarios, that allow for international emissions trading of Directive sectors
(denoted T), there are two market clearance conditions – one for Directive sectors ( z T )
and the other one for Non-Directive sectors ( z T ):
2 2
T
r zr
r r z T
CO  CO

   and 2 2 2
T
r r zr
z T
CO CO  CO

  ,
where 2
T
r CO  ( 0 2 2
T
r r CO CO  ) denotes the amount of emission allowances set aside for
the segments forming part of the trading system (T).
As to the allocation of emission allowances, our exposition of generic equilibrium conditions
in sections A.2 and A.3 cover the case of  carbon taxation or auctioning. Under output-based
assignment, the value of freely allocated emission rights constitutes a subsidy that enters the
zero-profit condition of sectoral production. Allowances per-unit of output are allocated to
Directive sectors in proportion to the benchmark emission intensity ir
ir
E
Y
. The implicit ad-
valorem output subsidy sir can be written as:
2( ) /
Y ir CO
ir r ir ir
ir
Es p p
Y
 ,
where 
Y
r denotes the endogenous emission allocation factor per unit of output. This factor is
determined by the associated “emission budget” constraint for the Directive sectors:
2
YT ir
r r ir
iri T
ECO Y
Y


  .
